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Economic Crisis – July 8 2011 CELS submission draft

ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SHARE PRICE UNPREDICTABILITY:
REASONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Edward G. Fox∗, Merritt B. Fox∗∗ & Ronald J. Gilson∗∗∗
The volatility of share returns for individual companies increased sharply during the
recent financial crisis. A portion of this increase is explained by economy wide factors that
affect share prices of all stocks in the market. The prospects of all firms are affected by the
economy as a whole and so when its future is less predictable, share prices of all firms, not
surprisingly, can be expected to jump around more. The larger part of this recent increase in
overall share price volatility, however, is due to a dramatic rise – five fold as measured by
variance – in “idiosyncratic risk,” i.e., an increase in the portion of overall share price volatility
that is independent of price changes in the market as a whole. This is an increase in the volatility
of each individual firm’s daily share price after this price has been adjusted the day’s changes in
the market index. Thus the increase cannot be explained by changes in predictions concerning
the future course of the economy as a whole. Rather we saw a large increase, relative to normal
times, in the extent to which an individual firm’s share price deviated independently from the
change in the market index. So, relative to normal times, on any given good day for the market
as a whole, we see far more big losers (and far more super winners), and on any given bad day
for the market as a whole, we see far more big winners (and far more super losers). Somehow,
during the financial crisis, there is less predictability with respect to those factors helping to
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determine a firm’s cash flows that are specific to each given firm, not just less predictability with
respect to the factors that affect the future cash flows of all firms in the economy.
Expanding on earlier work by Campbell et al,1 we conduct an empirical review,
extending back to 1926 and forward to the present, that shows that each major economic
downturn in this period has been accompanied by a substantial increase in idiosyncratic
volatility. We also break down the study to look at what happens in each of 60 two-digit SIC
sectors in the economy to see if differences among them can provide any clues as to what is
happening.
We have two goals in this paper. Our first goal is to explain why difficult economic
times, which are defined in terms of market wide phenomena, make the future of individual
firms more difficult to predict, above and beyond the effects of the more difficult to predict
economy as a whole. We explore several possible explanations why crisis times might be
different from ordinary times. One is that in crisis times, information about a firm contained in
current news may become more important, compared to ordinary times, in predicting its future
cash flows relative to the role of the already existing stock of knowledge relevant to making such
predictions. A second is that the quality of management becomes more important in crisis times;
consequently, the ordinary flow of information about this subject can have bigger impact. A
third is that crisis may create uncertainty as to what factors are even important to valuation;
because of uncertainty, a broader range of information may be seen to shed light on this question,
and therefore move stock prices. A fourth is that the increase in idiosyncratic risk is the result of
a bad-times-induced separating equilibrium that reveals which firms have fraudulent or inept
managers who were able to mask their problems in the preceding good times and which firms
1

John Y. Campbell, Martin Lettau, Burton G. Malkiel, and Yexiao Xu, Have Individual Stocks Become More
Volatile: An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1 (2001).
2

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881806

have been genuinely well managed all along. A fifth is noise trading. We ultimately find the
first three explanations more convincing than the latter two.
Our second goal is to explore the implications of our results for corporate and securities
litigation, which, over the last few decades, has become increasingly enmeshed with the
empirical analysis of the idiosyncratic portion of share returns of the companies involved. This
increase has occurred without an appreciation of the increase in idiosyncratic volatility that
accompanies bad economic times. In this connection, we consider the determination of loss
causation in fraud-on-the-market class actions, the determination of materiality necessary for a
trade on non-public information to violate the law, the determination of what items of
information should be subject to a mandatory disclosure, and the extent of deference that should
be paid to a corporate board that reject acquisition offers at a premium above pre-offer market
price.
I.

THE EMPIRICAL RECORD

A. The Recent Financial Crisis
From July 2008 to July 2009 the average risk for firms in the S&P 100 that cannot be
explained by broad market forces (“idiosyncratic risk”) increased about five-fold from the same
measure in 2006-2007 and three-fold from that of 2007-2008. While the most extraordinary
increases were among financial firms in the index – forty-fold over the two year period – the
non-financial firms increased almost four-fold themselves.2 These results are reported in Table
A below and are depicted graphically in Figure 1 at the end of the paper.

2

Firms in the S&P 100 as of March 9, 2009. This is the date we started the analysis. Our analysis of all firms traded
on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX yields similar results.
3
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Table A

Average Annual Company-Specific Volatility (Var)
Non-Financial
All
Financial

Period
July 1, 2005-June 30, 2006
July 1, 2006-June 30, 2007
July 1, 2007-June 30, 2008
July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009

3.5%
3.3%
5.7%
18.2%

1.8%
1.7%
8.9%
74.0%

3.8%
3.6%
5.4%
13.3%

B. Looking Back Over Eight Decades
A relationship between downturns in GDP and idiosyncratic risk was previously noted in
a 2001 article by Campbell et al. They find, in a study of data from the thirty-five year period
from 1962 to 1997, a sharp increase in idiosyncratice risk at the times of the 1970, 1974, 1980,
1982 and 1991 recessions as well as at the time of the October 1987 market break.3
We have performed a similar study, but extended the period covered from 1926 to the
present. We find that this pattern of increased idiosyncratic risk associated with poor
macroeconomic performance repeats itself throughout this much longer 85-year period, with
particularly high levels of idiosyncratic risk at the time of the stock market crash of 1929, the
early years of the Great Depression in the early 1930s, the economy’s retreat into deep recession
in 1937 and during the recent financial crisis. (see Figure 2 at the end of the paper)4 We also find
that idiosyncratic risk increases at times of market boom as well, although the relationship is
weaker.

3

Campbell et al, supra note 1, at 13 (figure 4)
We use firm specific risk as calculated in the CAPM model to identify idiosyncratic volatility, which is a
somewhat different methodology from that used by Campbell et al. Our results for the period that our study and
theirs overlap are very similar, however. See Figure 4 at the end of this paper.
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C. Sectoral Analysis
As was seen in table A, the increase in risk in the financial sector dramatically outpaced the
non-financial sector. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether among non-financial firms, the
overall increase in risk was driven by firms in a few industries, such as construction, that were
particularly affected by the structural changes precipitated by the crisis. However, as can be seen
in Table B at the end of the paper, there was a substantial increase in average idiosyncratic risk
in every one of the 60 industries surveyed.5 Every industry saw its risk increase more than 50%
and in 58 of 60 sectors the risk more than doubled.6 Moreover, controlling for industry-specific
factors, along with those of the broad market, did not alter the results. This means that in
explaining the increase in risk we must find causes that apply across all industries.
It may be nonetheless helpful, in assessing causal explanations, to look at what distinguishes
the sectors whose risk increased the most. Interestingly, the sectors whose firms had the most
exposure to changes in overall performance of the economy prior to the crisis, as measured by
the extent to which firm returns co-move with an index of the stock market as a whole (“β”),
were not the same sectors whose idiosyncratic risk increased the most. In fact, the opposite is
true: those sectors with relatively low βs prior to the crisis saw the largest increase in
idiosyncratic risk.

5

Industries are broken down by Two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) code. The 15 sectors which
contain less than 10 firms during the entire 2004-2009 period are not included, because there is not enough data to
reach reliable conclusions.
6
Codes 60-67 are financial. The largest increases among non-financial firms were hotels, amusement services,
lumber, and social services. Three of these sectors were particularly vulnerable to the crisis: spending on the first
two is among the first things cut when the economy sputters, and lumber is intimately tied into the health of the
building trade. Social services is harder to explain. It is likely a result of only having at most 14 firms in the sector
during the period.
5

Changes in β do have a significant impact on which industries saw the largest increase in
risk. In particular, sectors whose exposure to the market increased during the crisis were the
ones most likely to see spikes in their risk.7
II. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
The Campbell et al article, while presenting its interesting findings, was primarily
focused on a long-term secular trend in idiosyncratic volatility, which the authors found to be an
increasing portion of total volatility. They did not seek to explain their additional findings
concerning the pairing of economic downturns and idiosyncratic volatility that is the focus of our
inquiry. This pairing is worthy of further analysis, especially given the dramatic example
witnessed during the recent financial crisis and our findings of similar pairings occurring
regularly in the 35 years prior to period covered by Campbell et al. Our analysis suggests several
possible explanations, each of which merits further investigation.
A. Current News Becomes Relatively More Important
Share price in a rational market reflects investors’ predictions of an issuer’s future net
cash flows. This prediction is based on a large collection of bits of information, much of it
accumulated over a period of years but some of which is brand new. The information in the
brand new bits, which in an informationally efficient market is unpredictable in the direction of
its effect in advance of receipt, is what causes the issuer’s share price to fluctuate. How much

7

The results noted in this paragraph are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of financial firms. This result might
lead one to conclude that the observed increase in risk is an artifact of β instability, because mismeasurement of β
increases the measured risk. However, if this were the case we should also see an increase in risk in sectors whose
β’s dropped dramatically during the crisis and we do not. Actually, a sector whose β dropped during the crisis was
no more likely to see a relatively large increase in risk than those whose β was unchanged. As a sensitivity check
we also measured risk using very short periods (20 trading days) to minimize the possible impact of β instability.
The results are very similar to those presented above. Thus it does not appear that β instability is what is driving the
measured increase in risk.
6

price fluctuates depends on the predictive importance of the information content of the new bits
of information relative to the predictive value of the previously accumulated bits of information.
A period of economic crisis is likely to make the predictive importance of each day’s new
bits of information relatively more important. This may be true not just in the case of bits
relevant to predicting the future of the economy as a whole. It may be true as well for bits
relevant to predicting the future of just the firm in question or of its industry, independent of the
influence of the performance of the economy.
One reason for thinking that an economic crisis may enhance the predictive importance
of firm specific new bits of information is that an economic downturn might typically be
expected to be accompanied by a structural change in the real economy (in part because major
downturns are usually the result of some kind of imbalances such as, in the case of the recent
financial crisis, an unsustainable level of resources going into residential and commercial real
estate and into the financial industry), but the exact nature of this structural change and its
implications might not yet be fully understood.
Consider, for example, a not-fully-anticipated quarterly earnings announcement that is off
by 10%, one way or the other, from the path that earnings had been following the last few years.
This could be due to random, fluke factors not likely to repeat themselves, or it could be due to a
change in more enduring factors that will continue to influence the firm’s cash flows for many
periods to come. While such a not-fully-anticipated quarterly earnings change would almost
always have some impact on investor predictions about an issuer’s future cash flows and hence
on its share price, in normal times investors might assign very substantial weight to the longer
term pattern of earnings. Suppose, though, there is disruption and a sense that structural change
is occurring in the economy, but with no clear understanding of the nature of the change. The
7

new piece of information takes on more importance because there is a greater likelihood that the
change in earnings is due to new enduring factors, not fluke chance factors. Put differently, in
such times the news content of new bits of information has increased at the margin.8
A period where the market is rising rapidly, for example during the internet bubble, also
may signal disruption and structural change where a new piece of information takes on more
importance, and our findings are consistent with this as well.
Statistically, this explanation could be viewed as following. Imagine that you have a
barrel with 200 balls in it, some red and the rest green. You are trying to estimate the ratio of red
to green. Each period, you randomly draw one ball, note its color, put the ball back in the barrel,
and stir it again. After, say, 20 periods, you have a pretty good sense of the ratio in the barrel
and you will not change your estimate very much whether the 21st ball is red or green. Suppose
then 100 randomly selected balls are taken out of the barrel and substituted for them are 100 new
balls, with an unknown ratio of red to green that might quite different than the ratio of the 200
original balls. When you take out the 22nd ball, whether it is red or green will change your
estimate of the ratio in the barrel much more.
B. Quality of Management Becomes More Important
In an uncertain overall business environment, the quality of management may have a
larger impact on a firm’s cash flows. The importance of management of an established firm in
troubled times is more like the importance of management of a startup in normal times. In early
8

The opposite outcome is also possible. If the market has a widely shared model of a company’s future cash flows,
even a small deviation from expected results may dictate a change in the model of predicted cash flows that would
be significant when future cash flows are discounted to present value. For example, failure to meet expected
earnings even by a small amount by a company that prides itself on always meeting earnings estimates may signal
worse news that a few cents per share. The earnings miss may suggest that despite all efforts to massage the
numbers, the company still could not make the estimate, signaling a problem more significant than the small
reported earnings shortfall. This is the most rational explanation for large price movements as a result of small
failures to make expected earnings. Note that the account is largely driven by the precision of the market’s
valuation model, the importance of which is taken up in part C.
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stage companies, management is important because the companies’ value is comprised of future
growth options as opposed to existing businesses, in connection with which the management
quality has a larger impact on performance. Plausibly, management becomes more important
even in mature companies in the wake of a crisis where the predictability of future cash flows
drops and the marginal value of management in negotiating that increased uncertainty goes up.
Thus, in an uncertain overall business environment, even if the rate of flow of bits of information
as to the quality of management and the importance of each bit in revealing this quality stay the
same, the significance of each bit in predicting future cash flows becomes more important. Thus,
the revelation of each bit causes a bigger share price change.
C. Model Failure: Ignorance Concerning Even What Facts are Relevant
Investors’ expectations about an issuer’s future cash flows are typically based on an
implicit model that tells them something about the meaning and importance of some subset of
the vast number of new bits of information that are revealed in the world each day – they have a
model of future cash flows through which new information is processed. In a period of financial
crisis, investors become less confident that they any longer know what is the range of relevant
facts. The existing model no longer works and there is as yet no substitute. As a result of this
uncertainty about which factors matter, a much wider range of facts potentially matter, and so
stock price moves more frequently as a result of the larger range of now relevant facts. In the
face of model uncertainty, new bits of information thus tells investors both something both about
the the firm’s future cash flow and perhaps also something about the shape of a new model; that
is, about the range of information that in the future will be relevant for predicting the firm’s cash
flows. New information therefore provides marginal information both about future cash flows
and about how to evaluate that information. It thus can potentially move price a great deal.
9

This third explanation differs from our first explanation in that the situation in the first
explanation could be fully described in terms of risk while the third explanation resembles more
Knightian uncertainty. In terms of the analogy of sampling from a barrel of balls, one still needs
to estimate the ratio of the colors of the balls in the barrel, but after the crisis you can no longer
even be sure that there are only red balls and green balls after the substitution of the 100 new
balls. Balls of other colors also may have been put into the barrel as well. Suppose, after this
substitution, the 22nd ball drawn is not red or green, but yellow. The draw tells you not only
something about the ratio of balls, it tells you of a whole new kind of information relevant to
predicting the contents of the barrel.
D. Swimming Naked When the Tide Goes Out
Good times may permit firms with fraudulent or inept managers to report favorable
accounting numbers or even to make good payouts to investors. In such times, it is easy to
borrow against the future. In good times, the market knows that there are a certain number of
“bad” firms – ones with fraudulent or inept managers – but it knows that in such times the bad
firms can mask their managerial problems. As a result, no one can tell which are the bad firms
among all the firms in the market. Accordingly, the market in good times discounts all firms in
the market a certain amount for the chance that each is a masked bad firm – a pooling
equilibrium.
In troubled economic times, the bad firms can no longer hide their defects. The share
prices of these bad firms then are substantially (or totally) marked down. The share prices of the
rest of the firms in the market are now freed from suspicion, and are marked up. This sorting out
would cause idiosyncratic movement in share prices.

10

The problem with this explanation is that the measure of volatility that we and Campbell
et al use is the variance of daily price changes over a given period.9 While it is worth further
econometric exploration, it would seem likely that, for most firms in the sample, much of the
daily variance in the idiosyncratic portion of the firm’s returns comes from an increase in both
the upside and the downside. In contrast, the cleansing effect of bad economic times – revealing
which are the bad firms and which are the good ones – would, for any given firm, work in just
one direction. It is possible, however, that the phenomenon related to this explanation might
interact in some augmenting way with one of the other explanations. As we argued above, for
example, information revealing the actual quality of management should matter more in bad
times than in good thereby resulting in larger price movements on the revelation.
E. Noise trading
One of the explanations that Campbell et al offer as to the source of the long term
secular trend of increased idiosyncratic risk is an increase in noise trading, i.e., trading
irrationally based on fads and fashions not reflecting individual fundamental analysis.10 They
point out the increasing role of institutional traders and suggest that these traders form a small,
relatively homogeneous group whose sentiments may be influenced by a few common factors.11
Should this group share a common error in their models, then a large segment of the market will
be trading on a variant of noise. They also point to the increasing role of day traders in the
1990s, who may also have engaged in noise trading.

9

The volatility measures in Table A are the variance of daily returns over each of the four one year periods
indicated. The measure in each of Figures 1, 2 and 3 is the idiosyncratic variance of daily returns (which are
annualized) for a one year period looking backward from the date on the x-axis.
10
Campbell et al, supra note 1, at 40.
11
We note that this is a very different characterization of noise trading than commonly used in the finance literature.
There noise traders are uninformed investors, not sophisticated (even if engaging in herd behavior) institutions. See
Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (2000).
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Would noise trading of either variety help explain our results as well? Two questions
stand out. First, does irrational noise trading based on firm specific factors in fact increase
during troubled times? Here we are doubtful since individual investor, who are treated as a
proxy for noise trading in the literature,12 typically desert the market in times of crisis. Second,
even if it does, will this noise trading contribute more to daily volatility than the trading that it
replaces that was based on changes in rational expectations arising from new fundamental bits of
information? As to Campbell et. al.’s institutional noise traders, we question whether the
categorization is helpful. The market may be driven by a shared valuation model that proves to
be inaccurate ex post, but this is an example of a failure of fundamental efficiency, which is a
quite different thing.13 Unless, however, the institutional noise traders behave irrationally in the
face of the crisis, the phenomenon seems to us captured by the model uncertainty discussed in
the prior section. These matters warrant further attention.
Again, however, this explanation, even if not convincing standing alone, more plausibly
may combine with one of the other explanations to heighten variance. Thus, for example, noise
trading may complement the heightened impact of new information, so that it is the combination
of the two factors that is reflected in the increased volatility. As well, if any of the previous
explanations explained at least part of the increase in idiosyncratic risk during economic bad
times, this increased risk would make more costly the activities of rational arbitrageurs who
might otherwise profit by trading against noise traders. This is because the decreased portfolio
diversification that such trading requires will add more to the total risk of the arbitrageur’s
portfolio than would be the case if there were less idiosyncratic risk. Noise trading would
12

See, e.g., Charles Lee, Andrei. Shleifer, and Richard. Thaler, Investment Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund
Puzzle, 46 J.Fin. 75 (1991).
13
See Ronald J. Glson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis, working paper, Jan.
2011.
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therefore play a larger role in pricing, and, if noise trading is inherently more volatile than
trading based on fundamentals, idiosyncratic risk would become even more pronounced.
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Over the last few decades, financial economics tools and concepts have played an
increasing role in corporate and securities law. This increased role has proceeded without an
appreciation of the increase in idiosyncratic volatility that accompanies economic bad times,
precisely those times when dropping share prices likely will give rise to more plaintiffs’ suits.
The dramatic, several-fold increase in idiosyncratic risk that accompanied the recent financial
crisis brings the existence of this pairing into bold relief. With a new understanding of this
phenomenon, to what extent, if any, should the use of these concepts and tools be reevaluated?
A. Fraud-on-the-market suits
Fraud-on-the-market suits allow secondary market purchasers of shares that have been
inflated in price by the issuer’s material misstatement or omission in violation of Rule 10b-5 to
sustain a class action suit for damages without having to prove reliance on the part of each
member of the class. These actions, based on alleged violations of Sec. 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, give
rise to the bulk of all private litigation damages paid out in settlements and judgments under the
U.S. securities laws. In these cases, reliance on the issuer’s misstatements is functionally
eliminated because each class member is presumed to have relied on the market priced of the
security, which in an efficient market will reflect the impact of the issuer’s misstatement or
omission. This central focus on market price makes changes in volatility important.
Simplifying somewhat, courts in these cases have come typically to require plaintiffs to
conduct an event study of the market’s reaction when the truth comes out and show that the
13

original misstatement inflated the issuer’s share price and that the plaintiffs suffered a loss as a
direct result. This is a showing that has been required at an increasingly early stage in the
proceedings.14
The starting point is for the plaintiff to conduct an event study to determine the market
adjusted change in the issuer’s share price at the time that the truth comes out. 15 The magnitude
of this market adjusted change must then be compared with the historical record of the ups and
downs in the issuer’s market adjusted returns. Generally, the plaintiff will fail if, based on this
comparison, the event study does not show that there is a less than a 5% chance of observing a
market adjusted change of this magnitude as the result of the other kinds of factors that have
historically been creating idiosyncratic volatility in the issuer’s share returns. More specifically,
this test of statistical significance involves a comparison of the size of this market adjusted price
change to typical day to day market adjusted movements in price – the standard test requiring
this movement to be greater than approximately two standard deviations in the usual day to day
market adjusted movement. It is commonplace to measure background volatility over a one year
period prior to the disclosure in question.
When there has recently been a large increase in idiosyncratic volatility, consider the
consequences of using as a baseline the standard deviation of idiosyncratic fluctuations for a
period that includes time prior to this increase. Many more than 5% of the days after this
increase will appear statistically significant. Thus, if the truth were announced on one of these

14

A recent article sympathetic to plaintiffs explains the conclusion that an event study is mandatory for a securities
class action case to proceed. See Michael J. Kaufman & John Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling dispositive
Role of Event Studies in Fraud Litigation, 15 Stan. J. Law, Bus. & Fin. 183 (2009).
15
The basic steps in conducting an event study are set out in John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig
MacKinley, The Econometrics of Financial Markets (1998).
14

days after the increase, there is a considerably greater than a 5% chance that the drop that day
was caused by something other than this revelation of the truth.
If instead the period for measuring the baseline volatility starts with the increase in
idiosyncratic volatility, it is likely to include the day or days that the truth is revealed and in
addition may not be a long enough period to make reliable estimates of the parameters. The
econometrics of this approach, particularly if must take into account changes in volatility during
the measuring period, are more difficult. These technical problems make the tests less powerful.
These problems do not disappear even if the period of increased idiosyncratic risk
extends long enough and the level of this risk is stable enough to avoid these econometric
problems. In such times of increased idiosyncratic risk, a misstatement followed by a revelation
of truth that in fact has had some impact on price must have a larger impact on price than in
normal times for it to be likely that the observed market adjusted price drop that accompanies the
revelation to be considered statistically significant. In simpler terms, the price drop at the time of
the revelation of the truth will need to be bigger to be statistically significant, without which the
plaintiff’s claim fails. There may thus be more situations where a misstatement in fact inflated
price that will not, at the time of the revelation of the truth, be accompanied by a price drop that
is statistically significant at the 5% level. Presumably, more bad acts will go unpunished and
hence undetered.
A response to this concern might be that according to at least some of our explanations of
crisis-related increased volatility, the same misstatement made in a period of high idiosyncratic
volatility will have a commensurately larger impact on price. So the problem is in essence self
correcting. To the extent that these explanations are correct, this self correction must indeed
occur with respect to some misstatements. But other misstatements may not have a magnified
15

influence on price during a crisis. We have reason to continue to be concerned with these nonmagnified misstatements as well. One of the functions of these suits is to deter price distorting
misstatements because of the role that accurate prices play in guiding actions in the real
economy. The absolute level of the distortion is what is important here, not how the distortion
compares with some elevated level of overall price volatility.
There are no simple answers to either of the econometric problems discussed here or the
higher threshold of change in price necessary for it to be considered statistically significant. In
essence, a crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk changes the trade off between false
positives and false negatives that arise from using event studies. It thus is worthy of
consideration whether this crisis-related change in the trade off calls for altering either the
econometrics of how variance is measured for purposes of determining statistical significance or
the use of 5% as the proper level of statistical significance. Doing so, however, is more than an
econometric problem. The focus on event studies results importantly from the focus on market
price to justify eliminating proof reliance on an issuer’s misstatements. The centrality of the
event study follows from that decision. In the context of real litigation, plaintiffs have the ability
to choose the days on which they focus their claims. Decreasing the required level of statistical
significance in turn increases plaintiffs’ ability to find days that, while statistically significant,
may not in fact be related to the claimed misrepresentation. Examining and understanding the
intersection of financial econometrics and legal standards requires a nuanced touch informed by
both statistics and practice..
A. Insider Trading
If the same kinds of information that insiders typically possess will have a bigger effect
on price when they are eventually revealed, this means that insiders will have more opportunities
16

to profit from insider trading. If event studies are used to determine the materiality of the
information and are adjusted to account for the increase in idiosyncratic risk, it is possible that
more insider trading will go unpunished, and hence undeterred, for the same reasons as discussed
just above.
The changed tradeoffs between false positives and false negatives are similar to that with
fraud-on-the-market suits, but it is worth asking whether the policy implications may be
different. This is because, unlike with fraud-on-the-market cases, there may not be self
correction because of magnification in even some cases the magnification of the impact of a
given bit of information is self correcting. Insider trading on a bit of information that in normal
times is small enough that we do not worry greatly that it goes unpunished and undeterred will
be worth more, and hence pose greater policy concerns, when its absolute impact is magnified in
times of crisis. But it will be equally unlikely as in normal times to be accompanied at the time it
becomes public by a market adjusted price change that is statistically significant at the 5% level.
C. Mandatory Periodic Disclosure
The appropriate level of required mandatory disclosure represents a cost benefit analysis
of the gains from providing more information against the additional costs of doing so. One
important purpose of mandatory disclosure is, again, to assure relatively accurate share prices
because of the role that accurate prices play in guiding actions in the real economy. If a given
piece of information has a magnified impact on price in periods of crisis-induced increased
idiosyncratic risk, this fact might call for it to be disclosed when a cost-benefit analysis would
not call for it being disclosed in more normal times. Such a change in standards could be
accomplished by specific rules asking firms more specific questions during such extraordinary
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times, but this is likely to be administratively impractical.16 Once put into an administrative
context, it also raises the issue of how to define the “crisis” whose occurrence triggers the change
in standards.
It may be, however, that the current disclosure rules already anticipate this issue. Since
1980, issuers registered under the Exchange Act have been subject to the enhanced
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis” (“MD&A”) disclosure rules. The MD&A rules
require in Item 303(a)(3)(ii) that the issuer “describe any trends or uncertainties that have had or
that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net
sales or revenues or income” and to report on “events that will cause a material change in the
relationship between costs and revenues.” Most significantly, the instructions tell issuers to
“focus specifically on material events and uncertainties known to management that would cause
reported financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or
future financial condition.” Thus, if disclosure of a given kind of information becomes more
important for predicting future cash flows during crisis-induced increased idiosyncratic risk
times, it becomes more likely that the MD&A rules call for its disclosure.
D. Deference to Board Rejections of Premium Acquisition Offers
Tolerance of board decisions to reject and defend against hostile acquisition offers
depends in part on how accurate one believes share prices are as a prediction of an issuer’s future
cash flows if incumbent management remains. If these prices are believed to be relatively
accurate, it is harder to justify rejection of an offer at a premium as being in shareholders’ best
interests. The increase in idiosyncratic risk during times of economic distress suggests that share
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To the extent that, as is common, disclosure rules are phrased in terms of materiality, the problem may take care
of itself to the extent that “material” is interpreted to mean the potential for a given percentage magnitude impact on
price.
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prices are less accurate predictors during these periods. Does this mean there should be more
deference to the board’s view of the offer? Or should we assume that the foresight of the board is
degraded to the same extent as is that of the market, particularly to the extent the crisis is
general?
IV. CONCLUSION
The volatility of share returns for individual companies increased sharply during the
recent financial crisis. The larger part of this increase was due to a dramatic rise – five fold as
measured by variance – in idiosyncratic risk. We find that this pattern repeats itself during each
major economic reversal going back 85 years. Because idiosyncratic risk is what is involved,
this increase cannot be explained by changes in predictions concerning the future course of the
economy as a whole.
Our first goal is to explain why difficult economic times, which are defined in terms of
market wide phenomena, make the future of individual firms more difficult to predict, above and
beyond the effects of the more difficult to predict economy as a whole. One explanation is that
in crisis times, information about a firm contained in current news may become more important,
compared to ordinary times, in predicting its future cash flows relative to the role of the already
existing stock of knowledge relevant to making such predictions. A second is that the quality of
management becomes more important in crisis times; consequently, the ordinary flow of
information about this subject can have bigger impact. A third is that crisis may create
uncertainty as to what factors are even important to valuation; because of uncertainty, a broader
range of information may be seen to shed light on this question, and therefore move stock prices.
We find less convincing two other possible explanations: noise trading and the idea that the
increase in idiosyncratic risk is the result of a bad-times-induced separating equilibrium that
19

reveals which firms have fraudulent or inept managers who were able to mask their problems in
the preceding good times and which firms have been genuinely well managed all along.
Our second goal is to explore the implications of our results for corporate and securities
litigation, which, over the last few decades, has become increasingly enmeshed with the
empirical analysis of the idiosyncratic portion of share returns of the companies involved. In this
connection, we consider the determination of loss causation in fraud-on-the-market class actions,
the determination of materiality necessary for a trade on non-public information to violate the
law, the determination of what items of information should be subject to a mandatory disclosure,
and the extent of deference that should be paid to a corporate board that reject acquisition offers
at a premium above pre-offer market price. In each of these areas, we find that there are no
simple answers to the question of whether the increase in idiosyncratic risk during periods of
crisis would justify a change in practice.
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Figures:
Figure 1
Idiosyncratic Risk (Variance)
Measured by One Year Backward Looking Periods on Each Date From
November 2005 to April 2009
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Figure 2
Market-Cap-Weighted-Average Annualized Firm-Specific Risk (Variance)
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Figure 3
Market-Cap-Weighted-Average Firm-Specific Risk (Variance)
Fox, Fox, and Gilson v. Campbell et al.
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